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The EU’s Conflict Minerals Regulation, which will come into force in 2021, aims
to restrict the trade of minerals that are mined via forced labour and used to
finance armed conflicts. As Dirk-Jan Koch and Olga Burlyuk explain, the EU
attempted to learn from the mistakes of earlier legislation in the United States
that had sought to tackle the problem. They write that while EU processes can
be lengthy and bureaucratic, the case of conflict minerals legislation shows
these long-winded processes do create a setting in which lessons can be
learned.
It is easier to learn from your own mistakes than from the mistakes of
others. But can a cumbersome political structure like the European Union
learn from the mistakes of policies tried elsewhere? It turns out that it can
and it does – or so we see in the case of regulating trade in conflict
minerals.
When the EU was drafting and eventually adopted its regulation on conflict minerals in
2017, seven years after the United States had adopted its own legislation on the matter
in 2010, the EU actively drew lessons from the negative unintended consequences of the
American law. You might think ‘good news is no news’ and stop reading here. But there is
a great deal to learn from the experience and the critical elements – which might be
lacking in other policy instances and contexts – that stimulated the EU to learn in this
particular case.
During the financial crisis of 2008-10, the Obama administration sought to develop extra
regulation to reduce risks in the financial sector and drafted the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. As
part of this wider regulation, Article 1502 with respect to conflict minerals originating
from the Democratic Republic of Congo was introduced after intense lobbying by the
conflict-minerals campaign. It obliged stock-listed companies in the US to declare which
measures they had exercised to prevent ‘blood minerals’ in their supply chain from
contributing to conflict in the Great Lakes region. The law addressed a serious problem:
violent conflict around the mining areas in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a lack
of transparency about where the minerals mined there end up.
Alas, this highly necessary and seemingly well-intended piece of legislation spurred a
host of, sometimes exaggerated,  negative unintended effects. The Dodd-Frank Act was
introduced rather hastily and singled out one specific region, causing a shock-effect.
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Smelters and refiners started to boycott the Great Lakes region at large rather than
problematic mines selectively. As a result, a de-facto embargo emerged in the early days
of the law, negatively affecting the ‘clean’ mining areas and miners.
Credit: Enough Project (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
While the European Parliament quickly declared its own wish to legislate on conflict-
mining, it didn’t want to further destroy the livelihoods of legitimate miners. Eventually,
the EU seems to have succeeded in drafting a ‘better law’, different from the US law on
three counts: it has global scope (to minimise the effect of stigmatising one region); it
foresees gradual implementation (to avoid a shock-effect); and it focuses on inclusion
instead of exclusion (in that companies need to demonstrate measures they have taken
to improve the situation rather than declare themselves ‘conflict-free’).
The advocacy coalition framework provides some clues for understanding how such a
sensible policy outcome came about. Advocacy coalitions comprise individuals who
belong to different groups (for example, civil servants, journalists, academics and
politicians) but share underlying core principles. These actors share a set of normative
and causal beliefs and engage in coordinated activity over time. In the case of the US
and EU conflict mineral laws discussed here, two opposing transatlantic advocacy
coalitions emerged: pro-regulation and against-regulation. Both pushed the EU to
consider the effects of the US law, but in very different ways.
The pro-regulation camp proposed as the main takeaway that EU regulation should have
global scope because of the unintended consequences of stigmatising one region (which
was taken on board). The against-regulation camp argued that the regulation ought to be
voluntary because of unintended consequences in producing countries and because of
the administrative burden for companies (which was taken on board in part).
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While the EU did learn, this policy learning proved to be a politicised process bounded by
clear limits. Evidence about the unintended effects was socially constructed by advocacy
coalitions in function of their respective agendas. The degree of learning depended on
the frames and the strength of advocacy coalitions and was not a neutral, technical
process. The lessons from advocacy coalitions with stronger frames (‘blood minerals’)
were taken up more readily than those with less attractive frames (‘let’s reduce the
administrative burden’). Similarly, advocacy coalitions with growing and increasingly
vocal membership were more likely to see their proposed lessons learned.
The two opposing advocacy coalitions did not substantially learn from each other; but
when they did, a neutral platform such as the OECD played an important facilitating role.
For this, the OECD ensured that its agenda was set in a multi-stakeholder way, with
members of opposing advocacy coalitions (NGOs and businesses) jointly determining the
director of the forum.
While there is much criticism about EU processes being lengthy and bureaucratic, the
case of conflict minerals legislation shows that these long-winded processes do create a
setting in which lessons can be identified, discussed and eventually learned. It remains to
be seen what the negative unintended consequences of EU conflict minerals legislation
will be when the regulation enters into force in 2021. Yet it is important to remember
that EU institutions are willing and capable of making an effort to anticipate and mitigate
those when they occur.
For more information, see the authors’ accompanying paper in the Journal of European
Public Policy (available open access)
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